Workmen\u27s Compensation--Liability of Employer in Common Law Action for Damages Resulting from a Disease Not Enumerated in the Statute (Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., Inc., 266 N.Y. 139 (1934)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 9 
Number 2 Volume 9, May 1935, Number 2 Article 22 
June 2014 
Workmen's Compensation--Liability of Employer in Common Law 
Action for Damages Resulting from a Disease Not Enumerated in 
the Statute (Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., Inc., 266 N.Y. 139 
(1934)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1935) "Workmen's Compensation--Liability of Employer in Common Law Action for 
Damages Resulting from a Disease Not Enumerated in the Statute (Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., Inc., 
266 N.Y. 139 (1934))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 9 : No. 2 , Article 22. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss2/22 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
But this construction gives a special meaning to Section 220
which disregards the distinction there made between service in gen-
eral and service by a sheriff when process is delivered to him for
that purpose. Such interpretation should not be made unless the in-
tent of the legislature clearly points to that construction.1 3 General-
ization by the court of the meaning of "personal service" under Sec-
tion 1714 does not seem warranted, 5 nor does their disregard of the
evident distinction found in Section 220.
J. T. B., JR.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER IN COM-
MON LAW AcTIoN FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A DIsEAsE NOT
ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTE.-His claim having been dismissed
by the State Industrial Board; plaintiff brought this action at law.
He alleged that he was an employee of the defendant and that in the
course of his employment in defendant's factory he inhaled dust and
other impurities which caused him to contract silicosis. The defen-
dant is charged with failure to exercise reasonable care in the per-
formance of duties imposed by statute and common law.1 The
disease from which the plaintiff is suffering is not an "occupational
disease" for which the statute imposes a liability on the employer
to provide compensation. 2  The defendant, having complied with
the Workmen's Compensation Law in all respects, moved to dismiss
the complaint under rules 106 and 107 of the Rules of Civil Prac-
tice. This was denied and on appeal held, affirmed. In cases not
covered by the statute, the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol.
Laws, ch. 67) does not bar an action at law by the employee against
the employer to recover damages sustained through his contracting
an occupational disease not enumerated in the statute, by reason of
the alleged negligence of the employer. Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw
Co., Inc., 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
a People v. Long Island R. Co., 194 N. Y. 130, 87 N. E. 79 (1909).
"Supra note 1.
People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137, 150, 15 N. E. 371, 376 (1888) ; Pardy
v. Boomhower Grocery Co., 178 App. Div. 347, 164 N. Y. Supp. 775, 777 (3d
Dept. 1917) ; In re Kassam's Estate, 141 Misc. 366, 252 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1931),
aff'd without opinion, 235 App. Div. 609, 255 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1st Dept. 1931).
'Flike v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549 (1873) ; Daurizio v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 152 Misc. 716, 274 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1934).IN. Y. WORKMEN'S COmPENSATioN LAw (1922) §3, subd. 2, and §§11,
38, 48; see 73 A. L. R. 543, citing Williams v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds,
18 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 535 (1925) for the proposition that silicosis is not an
accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment but
is an industrial disease. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to set forth
facts showing that the statute does not apply. Nulle v. Hardman, 185 App.
Div. 351, 173 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1st Dept. 1918).
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At common law an employee had a cause of action for a disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment due to the negli-
gence of his employer, 3 subject to certain defenses which the latter
could set up.4 Neither the United States Constitution,5 nor the
State Constitution 6 limits the reasonable exercise of the power of
the legislature to create a new, exclusive system of compensation
for injuries sustained by an employee. By statute the legislature
has imposed a new liability on the employer,7 and, at the same time,
has made this liability for injury or death exclusive and in place
of any other liability "on account of such injury or death." 8 To
hold, as the appellant contends, that the mere enumeration of cer-
tain diseases for which the statute grants a right of compensation
leaves the party injured by the employer's negligence entirely with-
out a remedy in the case of a non-enumerated disease would be a
strained, unreasonable construction of Section 11 repugnant to the
humane and progressive purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Law9 for it not only would destroy a long-existing common law
right' 0 without giving anything in return therefor but would give
employers an opportunity to violate with impunity a statute in-
tended for the protection of employees." It was doubtful whether
the court would have implied, under Section 11 as it originally pro-
vided,12 the construction contended for by the appellant, and ex-
tended the statute beyond its subject matter where the legislature
did not expressly do so. 13 Today there is no doubt that to the ex-
tent that the field of industrial and occupational disease is not touched
by the statute it must be considered that the legislature intended that
the common law remedies should continue to exist,1 4 and this view
is further bulwarked by the present phraseology of Section 11 which
'Shinnick v. Clover Farms Co., 169 App. Div. 236, 154 N. Y. Supp. 423
(1st Dept. 1915); Trout v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp., 195 N. Y. Supp.
528 (1922).
'Wager v. White Star Candy Co., 217 App. Div. 316, 217 N. Y. Supp.
173 (3d Dept. 1926).
'N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1917).
'N. Y. STATE CONST. Art. I, §19.
'N. Y. WORKIEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1922) §10.
'N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1922) §11; Repka v. Fedders
Mfg. Co., 264 N. Y. 538, 191 N. E. 553 (1934).
'Trout v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp., supra note 3; Donnelly v. Min-
neapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N. W. 305 (1924).
'n Supra note 3; "Rights long existing should not be taken away except
by a statute where the purpose to do so is clear." Judson v. Fielding, 227
App. Div. 430, 435, 237 N. Y. Supp. 348, 354 (3d Dept. 1929).
'Cox v. U. S. Coal and Coke Co., 80 W. Va. 295, 92 S. E. 559 (1917);
Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 274 S. W. 972 (1923).
'N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1913) §11 as amended by L.
1914, c. 316.
" Shinnick v. Clover Farms Co., supra note 3; Donnelly v. Minneapolis
Mfg. Co., supra note 9.
" Nulle v. Hardman, supra note 2; Trout v. Wickwire Spencer Steel
Corp., supra note 3; Wager v. White Star Candy Co., supra note 4; List v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 236 App. Div. 830, 259 N. Y. Supp. 966 (4th Dept. 1932).
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expressly limits its scope to the same field to which the new system
of compensation is confined.15 This is the better rule for it is diffi-
cult to perceive a satisfactory and reasonable basis for the exemp-
tion of employers from liability for diseases caused by their negli-
gence, such diseases being noncompensable under the statute.1 6
A. S.
IN. Y. WORKMENS COMPENSATION LAW (1914) §11 as amended by
Laws of 1916, c. 622. Though the court has stated the doctrine to be that "the
employer's liability is exclusive" both under the old §11 (Shanahan v. Monarch
Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 409, 114 N. E. 795 [19161) and as it was amended(Repka v. Fedders Mfg. Co., supra note 8), still the statement of the court
as to exclusive liability is to be considered unimpeachable only as to matters
to which it was intended to be applicable, but cannot be deemed to be applicable
to matters not under consideration by the court, such as the question under
discussion.
" Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, supra note 11; Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg.
Co., suepra note 9. Contra: see Zajachuck v. Willard Storage Battery Co., 106
Ohio St. 538, 140 N. E. 405 (1933).
